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In an electric power system, demand fluctuations may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Fur-
thermore, in the near future, deep penetration of volatile renewable electricity generation is expected to
exacerbate the variability of demand on conventional thermal generating units. We address this issue by
explicitly modeling the ancillary cost associated with demand variability. We argue that a time-varying price
equal to the suppliers’ instantaneous marginal cost may not achieve social optimality, and that consumer
demand fluctuations should be properly priced. We propose a dynamic pricing mechanism that explicitly
encourages consumers to adapt their consumption so as to offset the variability of demand on conventional
units. Through a dynamic game-theoretic formulation, we show that (under suitable convexity assumptions)
the proposed pricing mechanism achieves social optimality asymptotically, as the number of consumers
increases to infinity. Numerical results demonstrate that compared with marginal cost pricing, the proposed
mechanism creates a stronger incentive for consumers to shift their peak load, and therefore has the potential
to reduce the need for long-term investment in peaking plants.
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1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the fact that fluctuations in the demand for electricity to be met by
conventional thermal generating units typically result in significantly increased, and nontrivial,
ancillary costs. Today, such demand fluctuations are mainly due to time-dependent consumer
preferences. In addition, in the future, a certain percentage of electricity production is required
by law in many states in the U.S. to come from renewable resources (Barbose et al. 2008). The
dramatic volatility of renewable energy resources may aggravate the variability of the demand for
conventional thermal generators and result in significant ancillary cost. More concretely, either
a demand surge or a decrease in renewable generation may result in (i) higher energy costs due
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to the deployment of peaking plants with higher ramping rates but higher marginal cost, such
as oil/gas combustion turbines, and (ii) the redispatch cost1 that the system will incur to meet
reserve constraints if the increase of demand (or decrease of renewable generation) causes a reserve
shortage.
There is general agreement that charging real-time prices (that reflect current operating con-
ditions) to electricity consumers has the potential of reducing supplier ancillary cost, improving
system efficiency, and lowering volatility in wholesale prices (US Department of Energy 2006, Spees
and Lave 2008, Chao 2010). Therefore, dynamic pricing, especially real-time marginal cost pricing,
is often identified as a priority for the implementation of wholesale electricity markets with respon-
sive demand (Hogan 2010), which in turn raises many new questions. For example, should prices
for a given time interval be calculated ex ante or ex post? Does real-time pricing introduce the
potential for new types of market instabilities? How is supplier competition affected? In this paper,
we abstract away from almost all of these questions and focus on the specific issue of whether
prices should also explicitly encourage consumers to adapt their demands so as to reduce supplier
ancillary cost.
To illustrate the issue that we focus on, we note that a basic model of electricity markets assumes
that the cost of satisfying a given level At of aggregate demand during period t is of the form
C(At). It then follows that in a well-functioning wholesale market, the observed price should more
or less reflect the marginal cost C ′(At). In particular, prices should be more or less determined
by the aggregate demand level. Empirical data do not quite support this view. Fig. 1 plots the
real-time system load and the hourly prices on February 11, 2011 and on February 16, 2011, as
reported by the New England ISO (ISO New England Inc. 2011). We observe that prices do not
seem to be determined solely by At but that the changes in demand, At−At−1, also play a major
role. In particular, the largest prices seem to occur after a demand surge, and not necessarily at
1 A certain level of reserve must always be maintained in an electric power system. Local reserve shortages are usually
due to the quick increase of system load rather than a capacity deficiency. If the increase of system load makes the
system short in reserves, the system will redispatch resources to increase the amount of reserves available. Redispatch
generally increases the generation cost and results in higher prices. The redispatch cost can be very high (cf. Section
2.3.2 of ISO New England Inc. (2010)).
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Figure 1 Real-time prices and actual system load, ISO New England Inc. Blue bars represent the real-time system
loads and the dots connected by a black line represent the hourly prices.
the hour when the load is highest. We take this as evidence that the total cost over T + 1 periods
is not of the form
T∑
t=0
C(At),
but rather of the form
T∑
t=0
(
C(At) +H(At−1,At)
)
, (1)
for a suitable function H.
We take the form of Eq. (1) as our starting point and raise the question of the appropriate prices.
A naive view would argue that at time t, At−1 has already been realized, and taking its value for
granted, a consumer should be charged a unit price equal to
C ′(At) +
∂
∂At
H(At−1,At), (2)
which is the supplier’s marginal cost at stage t. We refer to this naive approach as “marginal
cost pricing” (MCP). However, a simple argument based on standard mathematical programming
optimality conditions shows that for system optimality to obtain, the demand At−1 should also
incur (after At is realized) a unit price of
∂
∂At−1
H(At−1,At). (3)
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In day-ahead markets, suppliers typically carry out an intertemporal optimization, and it is rea-
sonable to expect that the two types of marginal costs, captured by Eqs. (2) and (3), are both
properly accounted for. However, in current real-time balancing markets, once At−1 is realized, a
supplier will aim at charging the marginal cost in Eq. (2), but will be unable to charge the addi-
tional marginal cost in Eq. (3) to the past demand At−1. In contrast, the pricing mechanism that
we propose and analyze in this paper is designed to include the additional marginal cost in Eq.
(3).2
The actual model that we consider will be richer from the one discussed above in a number
of respects. It includes an exogenous source of uncertainty (e.g., representing weather conditions)
that has an impact on consumer utility and supplier cost, and therefore the model can incorporate
the effects of volatile renewable electricity production. It allows for consumers with internal state
variables (e.g., a consumer’s demand may be affected by how much electricity she has already
used). It also allows for multiple consumer types (i.e., with different utility functions and different
internal state dynamics). Consumers are generally modeled as price-takers, as would be the case
in a model involving an infinity (a continuum) of consumers. However, we also consider the case
of finite consumer populations and explore certain equilibrium concepts that are well-suited to the
case of finite but large consumer populations. On the other hand, we ignore most of the distinctions
between ex post and ex ante prices. Instead, we assume that at each time step, the electricity
market clears. The details of how this could happen are important, but are generic to electricity
markets, hence not specific to our models, and somewhat orthogonal to the subject of this paper.
(See however Appendix B for some discussion of implementation issues.)
The ancillary cost function H(At−1,At) is of course a central element of our model. How can we
be sure that this is the right form? In general, redispatch and reserve dynamics are complicated
and one should not expect such a function to capture all of the complexity of the true system costs;
2 In current two-settlement systems, the real-time prices are charged only on the difference of the actual demand and
the estimated demand at the day-ahead market. However, the two-settlement system provides the same real-time
incentives to price-taking consumers, as if they were purchasing all of their electricity at the real-time prices (cf.
Chapter 3-2 of Stoft (2002)).
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perhaps, a more complex functional form such as H(At−2,At−1,At) would be more appropriate.
We believe that the form we have chosen is a good enough approximation, at least under certain
conditions. To argue this point, we present in Appendix A an example that involves a more detailed
system model (in which the true cost is a complicated function of the entire history of demands)
and show that a function of the form H(At−1,At) can capture most of the cost of ancillary services.
1.1. Summary of contributions
Before continuing, we provide here a roadmap of the paper together with a summary of our main
contributions.
(a) We provide a stylized (yet quite rich) model of an electricity market, which incorporates the
cost of ancillary services (cf. Section 2).
(b) We provide some justification of the form of the cost function in our model, as a reasonable
approximation of more detailed physical models (cf. Appendix A).
(c) We propose a pricing mechanism that properly charges for the effects of consumer actions
on ancillary services (cf. Section 3).
(d) For a continuum model involving nonatomic price-taking consumers, we consider Dynamic
Oblivious Equilibria (DOE), in which every consumer maximizes her expected payoff under the
sequence of prices induced by a DOE strategy profile (Section 4). We show that (under standard
convexity assumptions), our mechanism maximizes social welfare (cf. Theorem 2 in Section 6).
(e) We carry out a game-theoretic analysis of the case of a large but finite number of consumers.
We show that a large population of consumers who act according to a DOE (derived from an
associated continuum game) results in asymptotically optimal (as the number of consumers goes to
infinity) social welfare (cf. Theorem 2 in Section 6), and asymptotically maximizes every consumer’s
expected payoff (this is an “asymptotic Markov equilibrium” property; cf. Theorem 1 in Section
5).
(f) We illustrate the potential benefits of our mechanism through a simple numerical example.
In particular, we show that compared with marginal cost pricing, the proposed mechanism reduces
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the peak load, and therefore has the potential to reduce the need for long-term investments in
peaking plants (cf. Appendix E).
1.2. Related literature
There are two streams of literature, on electricity pricing and on game theory, that are relevant to
our work, and which we now proceed to discuss, while also highlighting the differences from the
present work.
Regarding electricity markets, the impact of supply friction on economic efficiency and price
volatility has received some recent attention. Mansur (2008) shows that under ramping constraints,
the prices faced by consumers may not necessarily equal the true supplier marginal cost. In a
continuous-time competitive market model, Cho and Meyn (2010a) show that the limited capa-
bility of generating units to meet real-time demand, due to relatively low ramping rates, does not
harm social welfare, but may result in extreme price fluctuations. In a similar spirit, Kizilkale and
Mannor (2010) construct a dynamic game-theoretic model to study the tradeoff between economic
efficiency and price volatility. Closer to the present paper, Cho and Meyn (2010b) construct a
dynamic newsboy model to study the reserve management problem in electricity markets, where
the demand is assumed to be exogenous. The supplier cost in their model depends not only on
the overall demand, but also on the generation resources used to satisfy the demand. For exam-
ple, a quickly increasing demand may require more responsive and more expensive resources (e.g.,
peaking generation plants).
To study the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior and load fluctuations, we
construct a dynamic game-theoretic model that differs from existing dynamic models for electricity
markets and incorporates both the consumers’ responses to real-time price fluctuations and the
suppliers’ ancillary cost incurred by load swings. Some major differences between our model and
existing ones are discussed at the end of Section 2.
On the game-theoretic side, the standard solution concept for stochastic dynamic games is the
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, Maskin and Tirole 1988),
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involving strategies where an agent’s action depends on the current state of all agents. As the num-
ber of agents grows large, the computation of an MPE is often intractable (Doraszelski and Pakes
2007). For this reason, alternative equilibrium concepts, for related games featuring a nonatomic
continuum of agents (e.g., “oblivious equilibrium” or “stationary equilibrium” for dynamic games
without aggregate shocks), have received much recent attention (Weintraub et al. 2009, Adlakha
et al. 2011).
There is a large literature on a variety of approximation properties of nonatomic equilibria (Mas-
Colell and Vives 1993, Al-Najjar 2004, 2008). Recently, Adlakha et al. (2011) derive sufficient
conditions for a stationary equilibrium strategy to have the Asymptotic Markov Equilibrium
(AME) property, i.e., a stationary equilibrium strategy asymptotically maximizes every agent’s
expected payoff (given that all the other agents use the same stationary equilibrium strategy), as
the number of agents grows large. Their model includes random shocks that are assumed to be
idiosyncratic across agents. However, in the problem that we are interested in, it is important to
incorporate aggregate shocks (such as weather conditions) that have a global impact on all agents.
In this spirit, Weintraub et al. (2010) consider a market model with aggregate profit shocks, and
study an equilibrium concept at which every firm’s strategy depends on the firm’s current state and
on the recent history of the aggregate shock. For a general dynamic game model with aggregate
shocks, Bodoh-Creed (2010) shows that a nonatomic counterpart of an MPE, which we refer to as a
Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE) in this paper, asymptotically approximates an MPE
in the sense that as the number of agents increases to infinity, the actions taken in an MPE can
be well approximated by those taken by a DOE strategy of the nonatomic limit game. However,
without further restrictive assumptions on the agents’ state transition kernel, the approximation
property of the actions taken by a DOE strategy does not imply the AME property of the DOE,
and we are not aware of any AME results for models that include aggregate shocks. Our work is
different in this respect: for a dynamic nonatomic model with aggregate shocks, which is a simplified
variation of the general model considered in Bodoh-Creed (2010), we prove the AME property of
a DOE.
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The efficiency of nonatomic equilibria for static games has been addressed in recent research
(Roughgarden and Tardos 2004, Milchtaich 2004, Bodoh-Creed 2011). For a dynamic industry
model with a continuum of identical producers and exogenous aggregate shocks, Lucas and Prescott
(1971) show (under convexity assumptions) that the expected social welfare is maximized at a
unique competitive equilibrium. In a similar spirit, in this paper we show (under convexity assump-
tions) that the proposed pricing mechanism maximizes the expected social welfare in a model
involving a continuum of (possibly heterogeneous) consumers. We also consider the case of a large
but finite number of consumers, and show that the expected social welfare is approximately maxi-
mized if all consumers act according to a nonatomic equilibrium (DOE). For large dynamic games,
the asymptotic social optimality of nonatomic equilibria (DOEs) established in this paper seems
to be new.
2. Model
We consider a (T + 1)-stage dynamic game with the following elements:
1. The game is played in discrete time. We index the time periods with t= 0,1, . . . , T . Each
stage may represent a five minute interval in real-time balancing markets where prices and dispatch
solutions are typically provided at five minute intervals.
2. There are n consumers, indexed by 1, . . . , n.
3. At each stage t, let st ∈ S be an exogenous state, which evolves as a Markov chain and
whose transitions are not affected by consumer actions. The set S is assumed to be finite. In
electricity markets, the exogenous state may represent time and/or weather conditions, which
impact consumer utility and supplier cost. It may also represent the level of renewable generation.
4. For notational conciseness, for t≥ 1, let st = (st−1, st), and let s0 = s0. We use St to denote
the set of all possible st. We refer to st as the global state at stage t.
5. Given an initial global state s0, the initial states (types) of the consumers, {xi,0}ni=1,
are independently drawn according to a probability measure ηs0 over a finite set X0. We use X to
denote the cardinality of X0.
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6. The state of consumer i at stage t is denoted by xi,t. At t= 0, consumer i’s initial state,
xi,0, indicates her type. For t= 1, . . . , T , we have xi,t = (xi,0, zi,t), where zi,t ∈ Z and Z = [0,Z] is
a compact subset of R. The variables {zi,t}ni=1 allow us to model intertemporal substitution effects
in consumer i’s demand.
7. We use Xt to denote a consumer’s state space at stage t. In particular, at stage t ≥ 1,
Xt =X0×Z.
8. At stage t, consumer i takes an action ai,t and receives a nonnegative utility
3 Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t).
9. Each consumer’s action space is A = [0,B], where B is a positive real number. (In the
electric power context, B could reflect a local transmission capacity constraint.)
10. We use At =
∑n
i=1 ai,t to denote the aggregate demand at stage t.
11. Given consumer i’s current state, xi,t, and the next exogenous state st+1, the next state of
consumer i is determined by her action taken at stage t, i.e., xi,t+1 = (xi,0, zi,t+1), where zi,t+1 =
r(xi,t, ai,t, st+1), for a given function r.
12. Let Gt =At +Rt be the capacity available at stage t, where Rt is the system reserve at
stage t. For simplicity, we assume that the system reserve at stage t depends only on the current
aggregate demand, At, and the current exogenous state st. That is, we have Rt = g(At, st) for a
given function of g that reflects the reserve policy of the system operator.
13. At stage t, let C(At,Rt, st) be the total conventional generation cost, that is, the sum of
the supplier’s cost to meet the aggregate demand At through its primary energy resources, e.g.,
base-load power plants, and the cost to maintain a system reserve Rt. Since Rt depends only on
At and st, we can write C(At,Rt, st) as a function of At and st, i.e., there exists a primary cost
function C : R× S → [0,∞) such that C(At, st) = C(At,Rt, st). We assume that for any s ∈ S,
C(·, s) is nondecreasing.
14. At stage t≥ 1, let H(At−1,At,Rt−1,Rt, st) denote the ancillary cost incurred by load swings4.
3 At t= 0, U0 is a mapping from X0×S×A to [0,∞), while for t≥ 1, Ut is a mapping from X0×Z×S×A to [0,∞).
4 In general, the supplier ancillary cost may depend on the entire history of system load and global states. However,
ancillary cost functions with the simple form H(At−1,At,Rt−1,Rt, st) can serve as a good approximation of the
supplier’s true ancillary cost (cf. Appendix A).
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Since Rt depends only on At and st, we can write H(At−1,At,Rt−1,Rt, st) as a function of At−1,
At, st−1, and st, i.e., there exists an ancillary cost function H : R2 × S2 → [0,∞) such that
H =H(At−1,At, st). The ancillary cost at stage 0 is assumed to be a function of s0 and A0.
15. At stage 0, the total supplier cost is of the form
C(A0, s0) +H0(A0, s0), (4)
and for t= 1, . . . , T , the total supplier cost at stage t is given by
C(At, st) +H(At−1,At, st). (5)
In contrast to existing dynamic models for electricity markets with an exogenous demand process
(Cho and Meyn 2010a,b), our dynamic game-theoretic model incorporates the consumer reactions
to price fluctuations, and allows us to study the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior
and economic efficiency. Through a dynamic game-theoretic formulation, Kizilkale and Mannor
(2010) study the tradeoff between economic efficiency and price volatility. Our model is different
from the one studied in Kizilkale and Mannor (2010) in the following respects:
1. Our model allows the generation cost to depend on an exogenous state, and therefore can
incorporate supply-side volatility due to uncertainty in renewable electricity generation. As an
example, consider a case where the exogenous state, st, represents the electricity generation from
renewable resources at stage t. Then the demand for conventional generation is At − st. Suppose
that the system reserve is proportional to the system load, say, δAt for some constant δ > 0. The
cost function, C(At,Rt, st), then depends only on the output of conventional generating units,
At− st, and the system reserve, δAt. The ancillary cost occurred at stage t depends on the system
reserve and the outputs of conventional generating units at stages t− 1 and t, and is therefore a
function of At−1, At, st−1, and st.
2. More important, instead of penalizing each consumer’s attempt to change her own action
across time, the ancillary cost function in our model penalizes the change in the aggregate demand
by all consumers. The change in a single consumer’s action may harm or benefit the social welfare,
while the volatility of the aggregate demand is usually undesirable.
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The main feature of our model is the ancillary cost function H, which makes the supplier cost
nonseparable over time. In an electric power system, the ancillary cost function models the costs
associated with the variability of conventional thermal generator output, such as the energy cost
of peaking plants and the redispatch cost. Note that the ancillary cost is not necessarily zero
when At ≤At−1, because thermal generating units have ramping-down constraints, and because a
decrease in renewable electricity production may lead to an increase of the system reserve, even
if At ≤At−1. The presence of the ancillary cost function makes conventional marginal cost pricing
inefficient (cf. Example 1 in Section 3).
To keep the model simple, we do not incorporate any idiosyncratic randomness in consumer
state evolution. Thus, besides the randomness of consumer types (initial states), the only source
of stochasticity in the model is the exogenous state st.
To effectively highlight the impact of pricing mechanisms on consumer behavior, as well as
on economic efficiency and demand volatility, we have made the following simplifications and
assumptions for the power grid:
(a) As in Cho and Meyn (2010a), we assume that the physical production capacity is large
enough so that the possible changes of the generation capacity are not constrained.
(b) Transmission capacity is large enough to avoid any congestion. We also assume that the cost
of supplying electricity to consumers at different locations is the same. Therefore, a common price
for all consumers is appropriate.
(c) We use a simplified form of ancillary cost functions, H(At−1,At,Rt−1,Rt, st), to approxi-
mate the supplier ancillary cost. In Appendix A, we present a numerical example to justify this
approximation.
3. The Pricing Mechanism
The marginal cost pricing mechanism discussed in Section 1 charges a time-varying unit price on
each consumer’s demand. As demonstrated in the following example, a time-varying price that
equals the supplier’s instantaneous marginal cost may not achieve social optimality in a setting
Tsitsiklis and Xu: Pricing of Fluctuations in Electricity Markets
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that includes ancillary costs. For this reason, we propose a new pricing mechanism that takes into
account the ancillary cost associated with a consumer’s demand at the previous stage.
Example 1. Consider a two-stage deterministic model with one consumer and one supplier. At
stage t, the consumer’s utility function is Ut : [0,∞)→ [0,∞). Let at denote the demand at stage
t, and let a= (a0, a1). Let gt denote the actual generation at stage t, and let g= (g0, g1). Two unit
prices, p0 and p1, are charged on the consumption at stage 0 and 1, respectively. Let p= (p0, p1).
The consumer’s payoff-maximization problem is
Maximize
a
U0(a0)− p0a0 +U1(a1)− p1a1. (6)
Let H0 be identically zero, and let the ancillary cost function at stage 1 depend only on the
difference between the supply at the two stages. That is, the ancillary cost at stage 1 is of the form
H(g1− g0). The supplier’s profit-maximization problem is
Maximize
g
p0g0 + p1g1−C(g0)−C(g1)−H(g1− g0). (7)
The social planner’s problem is
Maximize
(a,g)
U0(a0) +U1(a1)−C(g0)−C(g1)−H(g1− g0)
subject to a= g.
(8)
Now consider a competitive equilibrium, (a,g,p), at which the vector a solves the consumer’s
optimization problem (6), the vector g solves the supplier’s optimization problem (7), and the
market clears, i.e., a= g. Suppose that the utility functions are concave and continuously differen-
tiable, and that the cost functions C and H are convex and continuously differentiable. We further
assume that H ′(0) = 0, and that for t= 0,1, U ′t(0)> C
′(0), U ′t(B)< C
′(B). Then, there exists a
competitive equilibrium, (a,g,p), which satisfies the following conditions:{
U ′0(a0) = p0,
U ′1(a1) = p1,
{
C ′(a0)−H ′(a1− a0) = p0,
C ′(a1) +H
′(a1− a0) = p1.
(9)
We conclude that the competitive equilibrium solves the social welfare maximization problem in
(8), because it satisfies the following (sufficient) optimality conditions:
U ′0(a0) =C
′(a0)−H ′(a1− a0), U ′1(a1) =C ′(a1) +H ′(a1− a0),
a0 = g0, a1 = g1.
(10)
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However, we observe that the socially optimal price p0 does not equal the supplier’s instantaneous
marginal cost at stage 0, C ′(a0). Hence, by setting the price equal to C ′(a0), as would be done in
a real-time balancing market, we may not achieve social optimality. More generally, marginal cost
pricing need not be socially optimal because it does not take into account the externality conferred
by the action a0 on the ancillary cost at stage 1, H(a1 − a0). At a socially optimal competitive
equilibrium, the consumer should pay
(
C ′(a0)−H ′(a1− a0)
)
a0 +
(
C ′(a1) +H
′(a1− a0)
)
a1,
i.e., the price on a0 should be the sum of the supplier marginal cost at stage 0, C
′(a0), and the
marginal ancillary cost associated with a0, −H ′(a1 − a0), which is determined at the next stage,
after a1 is realized. 
Before describing the precise pricing mechanism we propose, we introduce a differentiability
assumption on the cost functions.
Assumption 1. For any s ∈ S, C(·, s) and H0(·, s) are continuously differentiable on [0,∞). For
any (A′, s)∈A×S2, H(A,A′, s) and H(A′,A, s) are continuously differentiable in A on [0,∞).5
Inspired by Example 1, we introduce prices
pt =C
′(At, st), t= 0, . . . , T, (11)
and
qt =
∂H(At−1,At, st)
∂At−1
, wt =
∂H(At−1,At, st)
∂At
, t= 1, . . . , T. (12)
At stage 0, we let q0 = 0 and w0 =H
′
0(A0, s0). Under the proposed pricing mechanism, consumer
i’s payoff at stage t is given by
Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t)− (pt +wt)ai,t− qtai,t−1. (13)
5 At the boundary of the domain, 0, we require continuity of the right-derivatives of C, H0, and H.
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Note that pt +wt is the supplier marginal cost at stage t (including the marginal ancillary cost).
The proposed pricing mechanism charges consumer i an additional price qt on her previous demand,
equal to the marginal ancillary cost with respect to ai,t−1.
We now define some of the notation that we will be using. For t= 1, . . . , T , let yi,t = (ai,t−1, xi,t)
be the augmented state of consumer i at stage t. At t = 0, let yi,0 = xi,0. For stage t, let Yt
be the set of all possible augmented states. In particular, we have Y0 = X0, and Yt =A×Xt, for
t= 1, . . . , T .
Let ∆n(D) be the set of empirical probability distributions over a given set D that can be
generated by n samples from D. (Note that empirical distributions are always discrete, even if D
is a continuous set.) Let ft ∈∆n(Yt) be the empirical distribution of the augmented state of all
consumers at stage t, and let f−i,t ∈∆n−1(Yt) be the empirical distribution of the augmented state
of all consumers (excluding consumer i) at stage t. We refer to ft as the population state at
stage t. Let ut ∈∆n(A) denote the empirical distribution of all consumers’ actions at stage t, and
let u−i,t ∈∆n−1(A) be the empirical distribution of all consumers’ (excluding consumer i) actions
at stage t.
For a given n, it can be seen from (11) and (12) that the prices, and thus the stage payoff in
(13), are determined by the current global state, st, consumer i’s current augmented state, yi,t,
and current action, ai,t, as well as the empirical distributions, f−i,t and u−i,t of other consumers’
current augmented state and action. Hence, for a certain function pi(·), we can write the stage
payoff in (13) as
pi(yi,t, st, ai,t, f−i,t, u−i,t) =Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t)− (pt +wt)ai,t− qtai,t−1. (14)
4. A Continuum Model and Dynamic Oblivious Strategies
To study the aggregate behavior of a large number of consumers, we consider a nonatomic game
involving a continuum of infinitesimally small consumers, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. We assume that
(under state s0) a fraction ηs0 of the consumers has initial state x. In a nonatomic model, any
single consumer’s action has no influence on the aggregate demand and the prices. We consider a
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class of strategies (dynamic oblivious strategies) in which a consumer’s action depends only on the
history of past exogenous states, ht = (s0, . . . , st), and her own current state
6, i.e., of the form
ai,t = νt(xi,t, ht).
Suppose that consumer i uses a dynamic oblivious strategy ν = (ν0, . . . , νT ). Since there is no
idiosyncratic randomness, given a history ht, the state xi,t of consumer i at stage t depends only
on her initial state xi,0. That is, there is a mapping lν,ht : X0 → Xt, such that xi,t = lν,ht(xi,0).
Therefore, we can specify the action taken by a dynamic oblivious strategy in the alternative form
ai,t = νt(xi,0, ht)
∆
= νt(lν,ht(xi,0), ht). (15)
We refer to ν = (ν0, . . . , νT ) as a dynamic oblivious strategy, and let V be the set of all such
strategies.
An alternative formulation involving strategies that depend on consumer expectations on future
prices would lead to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), an equilibrium concept based on
the rational expectations approach pioneered by Muth (1961). In our continuum model, since the
only source of stochasticity is from the exogenous state st, future prices under any given strategy
profile, are completely determined by the history ht. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that
strategies of the form (15) will lead to an equilibrium concept that is identical in outcomes with a
REE (cf. the discussion in Section 4.2).
Before formally defining a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE), we first provide some of the
intuition behind the definition. In a continuum model, if all consumers use a common dynamic
oblivious strategy ν, the aggregate demand and the prices at stage t depend only on the history
of exogenous states, ht = (s0, . . . , st). A dynamic oblivious strategy ν is a DOE (cf. the formal
definition in Section 4.2) if it maximizes every consumer’s expected total payoff, under the sequence
6 Note that a dynamic oblivious strategy depends only on the consumer’s current state, instead of her augmented
state. As we will see in Section 4.2, in a continuum model, since any single consumer has no influence on the prices,
a best response or equilibrium strategy need not take into account the action taken at the previous stage.
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of prices that ν induces. In Section 4.3, we associate a continuum model with a sequence of n-
consumer models (n = 1,2, . . .), and specify the relation between the continuum model and the
corresponding n-consumer model.
4.1. The sequence of prices induced by a dynamic oblivious strategy
Let ht = (s0, . . . , st) denote a history up to stage t, and let Ht = St+1 denote the set of all possible
such histories. Recall that in a continuum model, given an initial global state s0, the distribution
of consumers’ initial states is ηs0 . Therefore, under a history ht, if all consumers use the same
dynamic oblivious strategy ν, then the average demand is
A˜t|ν,ht =
∑
x∈X0
ηs0(x) · νt(x,ht). (16)
We now introduce the cost functions in a continuum model. Let C˜ :R×S → [0,∞) be a primary
cost function. Let H˜ : R2 ×S2→ [0,∞) be an ancillary cost function at stage t≥ 1, and let H˜0 :
R×S → [0,∞) be an ancillary cost function at the initial stage 0.
Given the cost functions in a continuum model, we define the sequence of prices induced by a
dynamic oblivious strategy as follows:
p˜t|ν,ht = C˜
′(A˜t|ν,ht , st), q˜0|ν,h0 = 0, w˜0|ν,h0 = H˜
′
0(A˜0|ν,h0 , s0), (17)
and for t≥ 1,
q˜t|ν,ht =
∂H˜
(
A˜t−1|ν,ht−1 , A˜t|ν,ht , st
)
∂A˜t−1|ν,ht−1
, w˜t|ν,ht =
∂H˜
(
A˜t−1|ν,ht−1 , A˜t|ν,ht , st
)
∂A˜t|ν,ht
. (18)
4.2. Equilibrium strategies
In this subsection we define the concept of a DOE. Suppose that all consumers other than i use a
dynamic oblivious strategy ν. In a continuum model, consumer i’s action does not affect the prices.
If all consumers except i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν, consumer i’s oblivious stage value
(the stage payoff in a continuum model) under a history ht and an action ai,t, is
pii,t(yi,t, ht, ai,t | ν) =Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t)− (p˜t|ν,ht + w˜t|ν,ht)ai,t− q˜t|ν,htai,t−1, (19)
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where the prices, p˜t|ν,ht , w˜t|ν,ht , and q˜t|ν,ht , are defined in (17) and (18). Since a single consumer’s
action cannot influence q˜t, the last term in (19) is not affected by the action ai,t, and the decision
ai,t at stage t need not take ai,t−1 into account, but should take q˜t+1 into account.
Consumer i’s oblivious stage value under a dynamic oblivious strategy νˆ, is7
pii,t(yi,t, ht | νˆ, ν) ∆= pii,t(yi,t, ht, νˆt(xi,0, ht) | ν). (20)
In particular, we use pii,t(yi,t, ht | ν, ν) to denote the oblivious stage value of consumer i at stage t, if
all consumers use the strategy ν. Given an initial global state s0 and an initial state of consumer i,
xi,0, her oblivious value function (total future expected payoff function in a continuum model)
is
V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | νˆ, ν) =E
{
T∑
τ=0
pii,τ (yi,τ , hτ | νˆ, ν)
}
, (21)
where the expectation is over the future global states, {sτ}Tτ=1.
Definition 1. A strategy ν is a Dynamic Oblivious Equilibrium (DOE) if
sup
ν̂∈V
V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | νˆ, ν) = V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | ν, ν), ∀xi,0 ∈X0, ∀s0 ∈ S.
A DOE is guaranteed to exist, under suitable assumptions, and this is known to be the case for
our model (under our assumptions), and even for a more general model that includes idiosyncratic
randomness (Bergin and Bernhardt 1992). The DOE, as defined above, is essentially the same
concept as the “dynamic competitive equilibrium” studied in Bodoh-Creed (2010), which is defined
as the nonatomic equivalent of an MPE, in a continuum model. At a DOE, the beliefs of all
consumers on future prices are consistent with the equilibrium outcomes. Therefore, a DOE is
identical in outcomes with a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE).
In future electricity markets, consumers may form rational expectations of future prices through
an adaptive learning process, or they may receive price estimates from utilities and/or the inde-
pendent system operator through advanced metering infrastructures. (In Appendix B, we provide
7 Recall that the initial state (the type) of consumer i, xi,0, is included in its state xi,t, for any t.
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some discussion of a possible implementation of the proposed real-time pricing mechanism.) If
so, a REE (equivalently, a DOE) will be a plausible outcome of such a market. Furthermore, we
will show (Theorem 2) that under the proposed pricing mechanism, and under certain convexity
assumptions, a DOE is socially optimal for the continuum model.
For a dynamic market model with aggregate profit shocks, Weintraub et al. (2010) introduce a
concept of “extended oblivious equilibrium” at which every firm’s strategy depends on its current
state and on the recent history (as opposed to the full history) of the aggregate shock. The extended
oblivious equilibrium is computationally tractable; however, an equilibrium strategy may not be
an approximate best response for every firm, even if the number of firms is large (cf. the error
bounds derived in Section 8.3 of Weintraub et al. (2010)).
Note that the definition of a DOE strategy requires optimality (attaining the supremum in
Definition 2) only along the equilibrium path (Bodoh-Creed 2010). Thus, a DOE is similar in spirit
to the “self-confirming equilibria” in Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and the “subjective equilibria”
in Kalai and Lehrer (1995), in which each agent forms correct beliefs about her opponents only
along the equilibrium path.
4.3. The n-consumer model associated with a continuum model
We want the cost functions in a continuum model to approximate the cost functions in an n-
consumer model. Since the continuum of consumers is described by distributions over [0,1], the
demand given in (16) can be regarded as the average demand per consumer. To capture this
correspondence, we assume the following relation between the cost functions in a continuum model
and their counterparts in a corresponding n-consumer model.
Assumption 2. For any n∈N, any s∈ S, and any s in S2, we have
Cn(A,s) = nC˜
(
A
n
,s
)
, Hn0 (A,s) = nH˜0
(
A
n
,s
)
, Hn(A,A′, s) = nH˜
(
A
n
,
A′
n
, s
)
,
where the superscript n is used to indicate that these are the cost functions associated with an
n-consumer model.
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Assumption 2 implies that
(Cn)′(A,s) = C˜ ′(A/n, s), (Hn0 )
′(A,s) = H˜ ′0(A/n, s), s∈ S,
and
∂Hn(A,A′, s)
∂A
=
∂H˜(A/n,A′/n, s)
∂(A/n)
,
∂Hn(A,A′, s)
∂A′
=
∂H˜(A/n,A′/n, s)
∂(A′/n)
, ∀s∈ S2,
i.e., the prices in the continuum model at the average demand equal the prices in the corresponding
n-consumer model.
5. Approximation in Large Games
In this section, we consider a sequence of dynamic games, and show that as the number of consumers
increases to infinity, a DOE strategy for the corresponding continuum game is asymptotically
optimal for every consumer (i.e., an approximate best response), if the other consumers follow
that same strategy. In the rest of the paper, we often use a superscript n to indicate quantities
associated with an n-consumer model.
Suppose that all consumers except i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν. Given a history ht and
an empirical distribution fn−i,t, we use v(ht, f
n
−i,t, ν) to denote the empirical distribution, u
n
−i,t, of
the actions taken by consumers excluding i. In an n-consumer model, suppose that consumer i
uses a history-dependent strategy κn = {κnt }Tt=0 of the form
ai,t = κ
n
t (yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t), (22)
while the other consumers use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν. Let Kn denote the set of all possible
history-dependent strategies κn for the n-consumer model. Note that since all other consumers use
an oblivious strategy ν, fn−i,t is completely determined by ν, f
n
−i,0, and ht.
The stage payoff received by consumer i at time t is
pini,t(yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t | κn, ν) = pin
(
yi,t, st, ai,t, f
n
−i,t, v(ht, f
n
−i,t, ν)
)
, (23)
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where ai,t = κ
n
t (yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t), and the stage payoff function on the right-hand side is given in (14).
Given an initial global state, s0, and consumer i’s initial state, xi,0, consumer i’s expected payoff
under the strategy κn is
V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | κn, ν) =E
{
T∑
t=0
pini,t(yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t | κn, ν)
}
, (24)
where the expectation is over the initial distribution fn−i,0 and over the future global states, {st}Tt=1.
In particular, we use V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | ν, ν) to denote the expected payoff obtained by consumer i if all
consumers use the strategy ν.
Definition 2. A dynamic oblivious strategy ν has the asymptotic Markov equilibrium
(AME) property (Adlakha et al. 2011), if for any initial global state s0 ∈ S, any initial consumer
state xi,0 ∈X0, and any sequence of history-dependent strategies {κn}, we have
limsup
n→∞
(
V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | κn, ν)−V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | ν, ν)
)≤ 0.
We will show that every DOE has the AME property, under the following assumption, which
strengthens Assumption 1.
Assumption 3. We assume that:
3.1. The following four families of functions, of A, {C˜ ′(A,s) : s ∈ S}, {H˜ ′0(A,s) : s ∈ S},
{∂H˜(A,A′, s)/∂A : (A′, s) ∈ A × S2}, and {∂H˜(A′,A, s)/∂A : (A′, s) ∈ A × S2}, are uniformly
equicontinuous on [0,∞).8
3.2. The marginal costs are bounded from above, i.e.,
|C˜ ′(A,s)| ≤ P, |H˜ ′0(A,s)| ≤ P, ∀(A,s)∈A×S,
and ∣∣∣∣∣∂H˜(A,A′, s)∂A
∣∣∣∣∣≤ P,
∣∣∣∣∣∂H˜(A′,A, s)∂A
∣∣∣∣∣≤ P, ∀(A′, s)∈A×S2,
where P is a positive constant.
8 A sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is to require a universal bound on the derivatives of the functions
in each family.
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3.3. The utility functions, {Ut(x, s, a)}Tt=0, are continuous in a and bounded above, i.e.,
Ut(x, s, a)≤Q, t= 0, . . . , T, ∀(x, s, a)∈Xt×S ×A,
where Q is a positive constant.
Combining with Assumption 2, Assumption 3.1 implies that for any ε > 0, there exists a δ > 0
such that for any positive integer n, if |A−A| ≤ nδ, then
∣∣(Cn)′(A,s)− (Cn)′(A,s)∣∣≤ ε, ∣∣(Hn0 )′(A,s)− (Hn0 )′(A,s)∣∣≤ ε, ∀s∈ S, (25)
and for any (A′, s)∈A×S2,
∣∣∣∣∂Hn(A,A′, s)∂A − ∂Hn(A,A′, s)∂A
∣∣∣∣≤ ε, ∣∣∣∣∂Hn(A′,A, s)∂A − ∂Hn(A′,A, s)∂A
∣∣∣∣≤ ε. (26)
Note that the boundness of the cost function derivatives implies the Lipschitz continuity of the
cost functions. Combining with Assumption 2, for any pair of real numbers (A,A), and any positive
integer n, we have
∣∣Cn(A,s)−Cn(A,s)∣∣≤ P |A−A|, ∣∣Hn0 (A,s)−Hn0 (A,s)∣∣≤ P |A−A|, ∀s∈ S, (27)
and for any (A′, s)∈A×S2,
∣∣Hn(A,A′, s)−Hn(A,A′, s)∣∣≤ P |A−A|, ∣∣Hn(A′,A, s)−Hn(A′,A, s)∣∣≤ P |A−A|. (28)
We argue in the following theorem that a DOE strategy approximately maximizes a consumer’s
expected payoff (among all possible history-dependent strategies) in a dynamic game with a large
but finite number of consumers, if the other consumers also use that strategy.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 2-3 hold. Every DOE has the AME property.
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix C. Various approximation properties of nonatomic equilibrium
concepts in a continuum game have been investigated in previous works. Sufficient conditions
for a stationary equilibrium (an equilibrium concept for a continuum game without aggregate
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uncertainty) to have the AME property are derived in Adlakha et al. (2011). For a continuum
game with both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainties, Bodoh-Creed (2010) shows that as the
number agents increases to infinity, the actions taken in an MPE can be well approximated by
some DOE strategy of the nonatomic limit game. Note, however, that in a general n-consumer
game, even if all consumers take an action that is close to the action taken by a DOE strategy of
the nonatomic limit game, the population states and the prices in the n-consumer game can still
be very different from their counterparts in the nonatomic limit game. Therefore, without further
assumptions on the consumers’ state transition kernel (e.g., continuous dependence of consumer
states on their previous actions), the approximation property of a DOE on the action space does
not necessarily imply the AME property of the DOE.
6. Asymptotic Social Optimality
In Section 6.1, we define the social welfare associated with an n-consumer model and with a con-
tinuum model. In Section 6.2, we show that for a continuum model, the social welfare is maximized
(over all symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profiles) at a DOE, and that for a sequence of
n-consumer models, if all consumers use the DOE strategy of the corresponding continuum model,
then the social welfare is asymptotically maximized, as the number of consumers increases to
infinity.
6.1. Social welfare
In an n-consumer model, let xt = (x1,t, . . . , xn,t) and at = (a1,t, . . . , an,t) be the vectors of consumer
states and actions, respectively, at stage t. Under the current global state st, the social welfare
realized at stage t is
W nt (xt, st,at) =−Cn(At, st)−Hn(At−1,At, st) +
n∑
i=1
Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t), t= 1, . . . , T, (29)
and at stage 0, the social welfare is
W nt (x0, s0,a0) =−Cn(A0, s0)−Hn0 (A0, s0) +
n∑
i=1
U0(xi,0, s0, ai,0). (30)
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Because of the symmetry of the problem, the social welfare at stage t depends on xt and at only
through the empirical distribution of state-action pairs. In particular, under a symmetric history-
dependent strategy profile κn = (κn, . . . , κn) (cf. the definition of a history-dependent strategy in
Eq. (22)), we can write the social welfare at time t (with a slight abuse of notation) as W nt (f
n
t , ht |
κn). Given an initial global state s0 and an initial population state f
n
0 , the expected social welfare
achieved under a symmetric history-dependent strategy profile κn is given by
Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn) =W n0 (fn0 , s0 |κn) +E
{
T∑
t=1
W nt (f
n
t , ht |κn)
}
, (31)
where the expectation is over the future global states {st}Tt=1. In particular, we use Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | νn)
to denote the expected social welfare achieved by the “symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy
profile”, νn = (ν, . . . , ν).
In a continuum model, suppose that all consumers use a common dynamic oblivious strategy ν.
Given an initial global state s0, the expected social welfare is
W˜0(s0 | ν) = W˜0(s0 | ν) +E
{
T∑
t=1
W˜t(ht | ν)
}
, (32)
where the expectation is over the future global states, {st}Tt=1. Here, W˜t(ht | ν) is the stage social
welfare under history ht:
W˜t(ht | ν) =−C˜(A˜t|ν,ht , st)− H˜(A˜t−1|ν,ht−1 , A˜t|ν,ht , st)
+
∑
x∈X0
ηs0(x)Ut (lν,ht(x), st, νt(x,ht)) , t= 1, . . . , T,
(33)
where lν,ht maps a consumer’s initial state into her state at stage t, under the history ht and the
dynamic oblivious strategy ν. The social welfare at stage 0 is given by
W˜0(s0 | ν) =−C˜(A˜0|ν,h0 , s0)− H˜0(A˜0|ν,h0 , s0) +
∑
x∈X0
ηs0(x)U0 (x, s0, ν0(x, s0)) . (34)
6.2. Asymptotic social optimality of a DOE
We now define some notation that will be useful in this subsection. Since there is no idiosyncratic
randomness, given a history ht, the state of consumer i at stage t depends only on her initial state
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xi,0, and her actions taken at τ = 0, . . . , t − 1. At stage t ≥ 1, the history ht and the transition
function zi,t+1 = r(xi,t, ai,t, st+1) define a mapping kht :X0×At→Z:
zi,t = kht(xi,0, ai,0, . . . , ai,t−1), t= 1, . . . , T. (35)
Given an initial state xi,0, consumer i’s total utility under a history ht can be written as a function
of her actions taken at stages τ = 0, . . . , t:
Uht(xi,0, ai,0, . . . , ai,t) =Ut(xi,0, s0, ai,0) +
t∑
τ=1
Ut(xi,0, khτ (xi,0, ai,0, . . . , ai,τ−1), sτ , ai,τ ). (36)
Before proving the main result of this section, we introduce a series of assumptions on the
convexity and differentiability of the cost and the utility functions.
Assumption 4. We assume the following.
4.1. For any s∈ S, C˜(·, s) is convex; for any s∈ S2, H˜(A,A′, s) is convex in (A,A′).
4.2. For any hT ∈HT and any xi,0 ∈X0, the function defined in (36) is concave with respect to
the vector (ai,0, . . . , ai,T ).
4.3. For any t≥ 1, any ht ∈Ht, and any xi,0 ∈X0, the function kht defined in (35) is monotonic
in ai,τ , for τ = 0, . . . , t − 1; further, its left and right derivatives with respect to ai,τ exist, for
τ = 0, . . . , t− 1.
4.4. For t ≥ 1, and for any (x, s, a) ∈ X0 × S × A, the left and right derivatives of the utility
function Ut(x, z, s, a) in z exist.
Assumption 4.1 is standard. If the utility function is concave in a, Assumption 4.2 requires that
the transition function kht preserves concavity (a linear function would be an example). Note that
Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 guarantee that in both models (a dynamic game with a finite number
of consumers, and the corresponding continuum game), the expected social welfare (consumer
i’s expected payoff) is concave in the vector of actions taken by all consumers (respectively, by
consumer i). Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4 ensure the existence of left and right derivatives of the
expected social welfare given in (32), with respect to the actions taken by consumers. An example
where Assumptions 4.2-4.4 hold is given next.
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Example 2. Consider appliances such as Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs), dish washers,
or clothes washers. For such appliances, a customer usually only cares whether a task is completed
before a certain time.
Given an initial state (type) of consumer i, xi,0, let D(xi,0) and T (xi,0) indicate her total desired
demand and the stage by which the task has to be completed, respectively. Under a given history
ht, the total utility accumulated by consumer i until time t is assumed to be of the form
Uht(xi,0, ai,0, . . . , ai,t) =Z
xi,0,min
D(xi,0),
min{T (xi,0),t}∑
τ=0
ai,τ

 ,
for some function Z. If for every xi,0 ∈X0, Z(xi,0, · ) is nondecreasing and concave, then Assumption
4.2 holds. At stage t= 0, we have
U0(xi,0, s0, ai,0) =Z (xi,0,min{D(xi,0), ai,0}) .
For t= 1, . . . , T (xi,0), we let zi,t =
∑t−1
τ=0 ai,τ , and
Ut(xi,0, zi,t, st, ai,t) =Z (xi,0,min{D(xi,0), ai,t + zi,t})−Z (xi,0,min{D(xi,0), zi,t}) .
For t ≥ T (xi,0) + 1, we let zi,t = D(xi,0), and let Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t) be identically zero. Suppose that
for every xi,0 ∈X0, the right and left derivatives of Z(xi,0, · ) exist. Then, Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4
hold. 
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 2-4 hold. Let ν be a DOE of the continuum game. Then,
the following hold.
(a) In the continuum game, the social welfare is maximized (over all symmetric dynamic obliv-
ious strategy profiles) at the DOE, i.e., 9
W˜0(s0 | ν) = supϑ∈V W˜0(s0 | ϑ), ∀s0 ∈ S,
where V is the set of all dynamic oblivious strategies.
9 Note that we are only comparing the social welfare under different symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profiles,
where all consumers are using the same dynamic oblivious strategy (ν or ϑ). This is no loss of generality because
under Assumption 4, the social welfare in a continuum game is a concave function of the collection of consumer
actions taken under the different histories. Hence, it can be shown that the optimal social welfare can be achieved by
a symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profile.
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(b) For a sequence of n-consumer games, the symmetric DOE strategy profile, νn = (ν, . . . , ν),
approximately maximizes the expected social welfare, as the number of consumers increases to
infinity. That is, for any initial global state s0, and any sequence of symmetric history-dependent
strategy profiles {κn}, we have10
limsup
n→∞
E
{Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn)−Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | νn)
n
}
≤ 0,
where the expectation is over the initial population state, fn0 .
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix D.
7. Conclusion and Future Directions
In an electric power system, load swings may result in significant ancillary cost to suppliers. Moti-
vated by the observation that marginal cost pricing may not achieve social optimality in electricity
markets, we proposed a new dynamic pricing mechanism that takes into account the externality
conferred by a consumer’s action on future ancillary cost. Besides proposing a suitable game-
theoretic model that incorporates the cost of load fluctuations and a particular pricing mechanism
for electricity markets, a main contribution of this paper was to show that the proposed pric-
ing mechanism achieves social optimality in a dynamic nonatomic game, and approximate social
optimality for the case of finitely many consumers, under certain convexity assumptions.
To compare the proposed pricing mechanism with marginal cost pricing, we presented a numerical
example in which the demand increases sharply at the last stage. In this example, the proposed
pricing mechanism creates a stronger incentive for consumers to shift their peak load than marginal
cost pricing, through an additional negative price charged on off-peak consumer demand. As a
result, compared with marginal cost pricing, the proposed pricing mechanism achieves a higher
social welfare, and at the same time, reduces the peak load, and therefore has the potential to
reduce the need for long-term investments in peaking plants.
10 Under Assumption 4, the social welfare in an n-consumer game is a concave function of the collection of consumer
actions taken under the different histories. Therefore, supκn∈KnWn0 (fn0 , s0 | κn) is also the maximum social welfare
that can be achieved by a (possibly non-symmetric) history-dependent strategy profile.
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We believe that the constructed dynamic game-theoretic model, the proposed pricing mechanism,
and more importantly, the insights provided by this work, can be applied to a more general class
of markets with friction. As an extension and future work, one can potentially develop and use
variations of our framework to a market of a perishable product/service where demand fluctuations
incur significant cost to suppliers. Examples include data centers implementing cloud services that
suffer from the switching costs to toggle a server into and out of a power-saving mode (Lin et al.
2011), and large organizations such as hospitals that use on-call staff to meet unexpected demand.
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Electronic Companion
A. Approximation of the supplier cost
In this appendix, we show via simulation that at least in some cases, the supplier cost (including
the cost of ancillary service) can be captured by a simplified cost function of the form in (5). We
consider a (T + 1)-stage dynamic model with two energy resources, a primary energy resource and
an ancillary energy resource. It is assumed that the forecast demand is met by the primary energy
resource (e.g., coal-fired or nuclear power generators), and that at stage t= 1, . . . , T , the deviations
from the forecast demand, {wt}Tt=1, are independent random variables uniformly distributed on
[−ω,ω]. At the initial stage 0, we assume that the forecast error is zero, i.e., w0 = 0.
At stage t, let bt denote the difference between the actual output of the primary energy resource
and the forecast demand, and let dt denote the output of the ancillary energy resource (e.g., oil/gas
combustion turbines). For simplicity, we will assume that the cost of a positive primary energy
resource (respectively, ancillary energy resource) is b2t (respectively, 10d
2
t ).
Let rb be the ramping rate of the primary energy resource, and rd be the ramping rate of the
ancillary energy resource. At the initial stage 0, we assume that b0 =w0 = 0, and d0 = 0. At stage
t≥ 1, if wt < 0, then dt = 0, and we assume that bt = 0, that is, the system operator maintains a
high level of (potential) output in order to be able to deal with a possible unexpected demand surge
in the future; if wt > 0, we assume that bt = min{wt, bt−1 + rb}, where bt−1 + rb is the maximum
possible output of the primary energy resource at stage t, and that dt = min{wt − bt, dt−1 + rd}.
The total supplier cost (excluding the cost to meet the forecast demand) is
C =
T∑
t=1
(
b2t + 10d
2
t
)
. (37)
For notational convenience, we let (·)+ = max{·,0}. We use the following function to approximate
the supplier cost:
C˜ =
T∑
t=1
(
b˜2t + 10d˜
2
t
)
, (38)
where d˜t = min
{
rd,
(
0,wt− (wt−1)+− rb
)+}
, and b˜t = (wt− d˜t)+.
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Figure 2 A simulation experiment with T = 24, and 500,000 trajectories for each ω/rb on the horizontal axis.
The approximation error is defined by |C − C˜|/C. The average approximation error (vertical axis) is
the mean value of the approximation errors of the 500,000 trajectories.
The function in (38) well approximates the supplier cost in (37), if for an unexpected demand
surge at stage t, the system load at the previous stage, wt−1, is met by the primary energy resource,
and load shedding rarely occurs (so that (wt)
+ typically equals bt +dt). Note that in (38), for each
stage t, the approximated cost depends only on wt−1 and wt. Therefore, the approximated cost in
(38) can be written as
C˜ =
T∑
t=1
(
((wt)
+)2 +H(wt−1,wt)
)
, (39)
where H(wt−1,wt) =
(
b˜2t + 10d˜
2
t − ((wt)+)2
)+
.
For different values of the parameters, rb, rd, and ω, we evaluate the performance of the approx-
imation via simulation. Fig. 2 depicts some numerical results of a simulation experiment and we
can make the following observations:
1. The main source of approximation error is from the following scenario: at stage t− 1, the
deviation in demand wt−1 is nonpositive, wt > rb, and wt+1 > 2rb. In this scenario, the output of
the primary energy source at stage t is rb, which is less than wt. When ω/rb ≤ 2, this scenario never
occurs and we observe from Fig. 2 that the approximation error is close to zero, regardless of the
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value of rd.
2. Comparing the black curve with the red curve in Fig. 2, we observe that when ω/rb > 3 (when
rb = 0.05 and ω > 0.15), the approximation error for the case where rd = 0.1 is larger than that for
the case where rd = 0.25. This is because for the case with rd = 0.1, as ω/rb increases from 3 to 6
(as ω increases from 0.15 to 0.3), the probability of load shedding increases, which deteriorates the
performance of the approximation.
3. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when the ramping rate of the ancillary energy resource
is high enough to prevent any load shedding, the approximation error is an increasing function of
the single parameter ω/rb (e.g., the blue curve with circle markers for rb = 0.02, rd = 0.1 and the
red curve for rb = 0.05, rd = 0.25 merge together in Fig. 2); in this case, we observe from Fig. 2 that
the approximation error is less than 10% for a wide range of parameter values.
B. Implementation of the proposed pricing mechanism
To implement a dynamic real-time pricing mechanism, all consumers should be exposed to time-
varying prices associated with ex ante estimates of generation costs that reflect system operating
conditions (p. 81 of Borenstein et al. (2002)) so that they can adjust their demand in accordance
to real-time prices as well as ex ante price estimates. The mechanism proposed in this paper is not
an exception. The ex ante estimates of real-time prices can be developed by evaluating statistical
relationships between historical real-time prices and various factors such as load forecast, weather
predictions, and expected supply/demand balances (Borenstein et al. 2002).
We now provide a brief discussion of the details of a possible implementation of the proposed
pricing mechanism:
Ex ante price estimates. Suppose that the exogenous state st is realized at the beginning of each
stage t; for every possible realization of the trajectory (scenario) of future exogenous states
{sτ}t+Tτ=t+1, consumers receive corresponding price estimates {pˆτ}t+Tτ=t , {wˆτ}t+Tτ=t , and {qˆτ}t+Tτ=t , from
utilities and/or the independent system operator. The consumers also know or receive the prob-
abilities of the different trajectories. With the received price estimates (associated with possible
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trajectories of future exogenous states) and preset utility functions, each consumer’s infrastructure
solves a dynamic programming problem to maximize her expected payoff over the horizon from
t to t + T . (The state at time τ in this dynamic program is comprised of yi,τ , and the history
(st, st+1, . . . , sτ .) The dimension of this state space grows with the time horizon T (because of the
exponentially increasing number of histories). Unfortunately, this is unavoidable for models of this
type, and might require some further approximations, e.g., in the spirit of Weintraub et al. (2010).
Ex post prices. At each stage t, after the realization of the system demands At−1 and At, consumers
pay ex post prices (pt,wt, qt) that are determined according to Eqs. (11) and (12).
Equilibrium. In a market with a large number of price-taking consumers, it is possible to make
ex ante price estimates (contingent on the realized trajectories) that are close to ex post prices.
If every consumer maximizes her own payoff in response to these pretty accurate price estimates,
the resulting outcome should be close to that resulting from a Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(REE). The results derived in this paper show that the expected social welfare can be approximately
maximized, under the proposed mechanism.
We emphasize here that there remain several challenging implementation issues, e.g., the accu-
racy of future price estimates and the uncertainty of consumer response to ex ante price estimates.
For example, Roozbehani et al. (2010) show that if consumers act myopically to highly inaccurate
price estimates, real-time pricing may result in extreme price volatility. However, we note that
these challenges are generic to almost all kinds of real-time pricing mechanisms.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
We consider a sequence of n-consumer models where n− 1 consumers (all except for consumer
i) use a DOE strategy ν. As the number of consumers increases to infinity, the randomness of
consumer initial states averages out. Thus, in Step 1 we show that the aggregate demand (in an
n-consumer model) at a history ht is close to nA˜t|ν,ht (defined in Eq. (16)), with high probability.
As a consequence, we show in Step 2 that as n→∞, consumer i’s expected payoff associated with
any sequence of actions can be approximated by her oblivious value defined in (21). Since the DOE
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strategy ν maximizes consumer i’s oblivious value among all possible strategies, we argue in Step
3 that as n→∞, the maximum expected payoff consumer i can obtain is asymptotically no larger
than the optimal oblivious value. In Step 4, we show that consumer i’s optimal oblivious value
can be approximately achieved if she uses the DOE strategy ν. We finally conclude with the AME
property of the DOE strategy ν (the result in Theorem 1).
In what follows, we will be using the uniform metric over the set of probability distributions on
the finite set X0. Specifically, if f and f ′ are two distributions on X0, we let
d(f, f ′)
∆
= ‖f − f ′‖∞ = maxx∈X0 |f(x)− f
′(x)| . (40)
Step 1: With high probability, the aggregate demand under a history ht is close to nA˜t|ν,ht.
Given an initial distribution fn−i,0, and if all consumers (excluding i) use a dynamic oblivious
strategy ν, we write their aggregate demand at a history ht as
An−i,t = (n− 1)
∑
x∈X0
fn−i,0(x)νt(x,ht).
Recall that (cf. (16))
A˜t|ν,ht =
∑
x∈X0
ηs0(x) · νt(x,ht).
We observe that if d(fn−i,0, ηs0)≤ δ/(XB), then at any history ht we have∣∣∣An−i,t− (n− 1)A˜t|ν,ht∣∣∣≤ δ(n− 1), (41)
with probability at least 1−O(e−n). More precisely, since the consumers’ initial states are inde-
pendently drawn according to ηs0 , Hoeffding’s inequality (Hoeffding (1963)) yields,
P
(
d(F n−1s0 , ηs0)≥ δ/(XB)
)≤ 2X exp{−2(n− 1)δ2/(X2B2)} , ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀δ > 0, ∀n∈N+, (42)
where X is the cardinality of the set X0 and F n−1s0 is an X-dimensional random vector denoting
the distribution of the initial states of the n− 1 consumers (excluding i).
Step 2: Under a given history hT , consumer i’s expected payoff can be approximated by a cor-
responding oblivious value, defined in (45).
Tsitsiklis and Xu: Pricing of Fluctuations in Electricity Markets
35
In an n-consumer model, suppose that all consumers other than i use a dynamic oblivious
strategy ν. Given a complete history hT = (s0, . . . , sT ), and consumer i’s initial state xi,0, we define
her expected payoff under a history-dependent strategy κn by
V ni,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν) =E
{
V ni,0(xi,0, hT , f
n
−i,0 | κn, ν)
}
,
where the expectation is over the initial distribution, fn−i,0, and V
n
i,0(xi,0, hT , f
n
−i,0 | κn, ν) is consumer
i’s payoff under the given initial distribution fn−i,0,
V ni,0(xi,0, hT , f
n
−i,0 | κn, ν) =
T∑
t=0
pini,t(yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t | κn, ν), (43)
and where the stage payoff function, pini,t(·), has been defined in (23). Note that given fn−i,0, and since
all consumers other than i use a dynamic oblivious strategy, the distribution of their augmented
states, fn−i,t, is completely determined by the history ht. Therefore, given f
n
−i,0, consumer i’s history-
dependent strategy κn is equivalent to a dynamic oblivious strategy: the action it takes at stage t
depends only on xi,0 and ht. We can therefore define an oblivious strategy ν˜
n(κn, fn−i,0) such that
ν˜t(κ
n, fn−i,0)(xi,0, ht) = κ
n
t (yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t),
where fn−i,t is the distribution of the n − 1 consumers’ augmented states under the history ht,
induced from the initial distribution fn−i,0 by the symmetric oblivious strategy profile (ν, . . . , ν),
and yi,t is consumer i’s augmented state under the history ht, induced from her initial state xi,0
by the strategy κn.
In the corresponding continuum model, suppose that all consumers other than i use a dynamic
oblivious strategy ν. For a given complete history hT , we define consumer i’s oblivious value under
an initial distribution fn−i,0, her initial state xi,0, and the history-dependent strategy κ
n:
V˜i,0(xi,0, hT , f
n
−i,0 | κn, ν) =
T∑
t=0
pii,t(yi,t, ht | ν˜(κn, fn−i,0), ν), (44)
where the oblivious stage value function pii,t(·) is given in (20). We define the expected oblivious
value for consumer i under the history-dependent strategy κn, as11
11 This is actually the oblivious value achieved by a mixed strategy under the complete history hT . In the continuum
model, under a history ht, the mixed strategy takes an action ν˜t(κ
n, fn−i,0)(xi,0, ht), if the distribution of the n− 1
consumers’ (excluding i’s) initial states in the corresponding n-consumer model is realized as fn−i,0.
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V˜i,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν) =E
{
V˜i,0(xi,0, hT , f
n
−i,0 | κn, ν)
}
, (45)
where the expectation is over the initial distribution, fn−i,0. For any ε > 0, in this step we aim
to show that there exists a positive integer N such that for any sequence of history-dependent
strategies {κn},
∣∣∣V˜i,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν)−V ni,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν)∣∣∣≤ ε, ∀n≥N, ∀hT ∈HT , ∀xi,0 ∈X0. (46)
For a given s0, let F
n−1
s0
(δ) be the set of fn−i,0 such that d(f
n
−i,0, ηs0)≤ δ. To verify (46), we first
argue that for any ε > 0, there exists an positive integer N1 and some δ > 0 such that for any
fn−i,0 ∈ Fn−1s0 (δ/(XB)) and any n≥N1,∣∣∣V˜i,0(xi,0, hT , fn−i,0 | κn, ν)−V ni,0(xi,0, hT , fn−i,0 | κn, ν)∣∣∣≤ ε/2, ∀hT ∈HT , ∀xi,0 ∈X0. (47)
Under the uniform equicontinuity assumption for the derivatives of the cost functions (see Eqs.
(25) and (26)), we know that a small deviation of the aggregate demand from A˜t|ν,ht will result in
prices that are only slightly different from the prices in the continuum model. We also note that
consumer i cannot take an action larger than B, and her payoff is influenced by other consumers
only through the prices. For any ε > 0, we can find some δ > 0 and a positive integer N1 such that
for any given (xi,0, ht), if f
n
−i,0 ∈ Fn−1s0 (δ/(XB)), then the inequality in (41) holds for any history
hτ , which implies that
∣∣pii,t(yi,t, ht, κnt (yi,t, ht, fn−i,t) | ν)−pini,t(yi,t, ht, fn−i,t | κn, ν)∣∣≤ ε/(2T + 2), ∀n≥N1, ∀ht, (48)
i.e., consumer i’s stage payoff (under the action κnt (yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t)) in the n-consumer model is close
to her oblivious stage value (under the same action κnt (yi,t, ht, f
n
−i,t)) in the continuum model, if the
initial distribution in the n-consumer model, fn−i,0, is close to its expectation. The result in (47)
follows from Eq. (48) and the definitions in (43) and (44). Note that Q+ 2BP is an upper bound
on the stage payoff that consumer i could obtain, and −2BP is a lower bound on consumer i’s
stage payoff, under Assumption 3. The desired result in (46) follows from (47), and the fact that
the probability that fn−i,0 /∈ Fn−1s0 (δ/(XB)) decays exponentially with n (cf. Eq. (42)).
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Step 3: The maximum expected payoff consumer i can obtain is asymptotically no larger than
the optimal oblivious value.
In this step, we consider the case where all consumers in an n-consumer model except for i use
a DOE strategy ν, and argue that for any sequence of history-dependent strategies {κn},
limsup
n→∞
(
V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | κn, ν)− V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | ν, ν)
)
≤ 0, ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀xi,0 ∈X0, (49)
where consumer i’s expected payoff, V ni,0 (x, s | κn, ν), is given in (24), and V˜i,0(x, s | ν, ν) is the
oblivious value function in (21). We first observe that
V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | κn, ν) =
∑
hT∈HT (s0)
P(hT | s0) ·V ni,0 (xi,0, hT | κn, ν) , (50)
where HT (s0) is the set of complete histories commencing at state s0, and P(hT | s0) is the proba-
bility that the history hT is realized, conditional on the initial global state being s0. We define
V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | κn, ν) =
∑
hT∈HT (s0)
P(hT | s0) · V˜i,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν). (51)
Note that if κn happens to be a dynamic oblivious strategy, this definition is consistent with the
definition of oblivious value function in (21).
For any ε > 0, let N be the integer defined in Eq. (46); for any sequence of history-dependent
strategies {κn}, we argue that
V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | ν, ν)≥
∑
hT∈HT (s0)
P(hT | s0) · V˜i,0 (xi,0, hT | κn, ν)
≥
∑
hT∈HT (s0)
P(hT | s0) · (V ni,0(xi,0, hT | κn, ν)− ε)
= V ni,0 (xi,0, s0 | κn, ν)− ε, ∀n≥N, ∀xi,0 ∈X0.
(52)
The DOE strategy ν, by definition, maximizes consumer i’s oblivious value function among all pos-
sible dynamic oblivious strategies. The first inequality in (52) follows from the fact that V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 |
κn, ν) is a weighted sum of the oblivious values achieved by a family of dynamic oblivious strate-
gies12. The second inequality in (52) is due to (46), and the last equality in (52) follows from (50).
The desired result, (49), follows.
12 Note that for a given fn−i,0, the action taken by κ
n depends only on xi,0 and ht, and that V˜i,0 (xi,0, hT | κn, ν) is
the oblivious value achieved by a mixed strategy; cf. the footnote associated with (45).
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Step 4: Consumer i’s optimal oblivious value can be asymptotically achieved at an n-consumer
game under a DOE strategy.
In this step, we consider the case where all consumers in an n-consumer model use a DOE
strategy ν, and show that
lim
n→∞
(
V˜i,0(xi,0, s0 | ν, ν)−V ni,0 (xi,0, s0, | ν, ν)
)
= 0, ∀s0 ∈ S, ∀xi,0 ∈X0. (53)
According to (46), with κn = ν, for any ε > 0, we can find some N such that
∣∣∣V˜i,0(xi,0, hT | ν, ν)−V ni,0(xi,0, hT | ν, ν)∣∣∣≤ ε, ∀n≥N, ∀hT ∈HT , ∀xi,0 ∈X0.
The desired result in (53) follows from (50) and (51). Theorem 1 follows from (49) and (53).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
D.1. Proof of Part (a)
We will show that in a continuum model, a DOE strategy maximizes the expected social welfare
among all possible symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profiles (part (a) of the theorem), i.e.,
that if ν is DOE, then
W˜0(s0 | ν) = supϑ∈V W˜0(s0 | ϑ), ∀s0 ∈ S. (54)
Let S and X be the cardinality of S and X0, respectively. Given the initial global state s0, the
number of possible histories of length t + 1 is St. Hence, the number of all possible histories
commencing at state s0 is
∑T
t=0S
t. Given an initial global state s0, the expected social welfare
defined in (32) is a deterministic function of the following (X
∑T
t=0S
t)-dimensional action vector:
{νt (x,ht)}x∈X0, ht∈H(s0) , (55)
where H(s0) is the set of positive probability histories commencing at state s0. Under Assumption
4, the expected social welfare defined in (32) is a concave function of the vector in (55). Therefore,
the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for the action vector (in the form of (55))
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associated with the DOE strategy ν to maximize the expected social welfare, among all possible
dynamic oblivious strategies13:
∂+Ut(lν,ht(xi,0), st, νt(xi,0, ht))
∂+νt(xi,0, ht)
≤ p˜t|ν,ht + w˜t|ν,ht + 1τ<T · g+t|ν,ht(xi,0),
if νt(xi,0, ht)<B,
∂−Ut(lν,ht(xi,0), st, νt(xi,0, ht))
∂−νt(xi,0, ht)
≥ p˜t|ν,ht + w˜t|ν,ht + 1τ<T · g−t|ν,ht(xi,0),
if νt(xi,0, ht)> 0,
(56)
where lν,ht(xi,0) is consumer i’s state, xi,t, under a (positive probability) history ht and the strategy
ν (cf. p.15), the prices, p˜t|ν,ht and w˜t|ν,ht are given in (17) and (18), and where, if khτ (·) (cf. the
definition in (35)) is nondecreasing in ai,t for any t < τ ≤ T , then g+t|ν,ht(xi,0) is given by14
g+t|ν,ht(xi,0) =E
{
q˜t+1|ν,ht+1 −
T∑
τ=t+1
∂+Uτ (xi,0, zi,τ , sτ , ai,τ )
∂+zi,τ
· ∂+zi,τ
∂+ai,t
}
, ∀xi,0 ∈X0, (57)
where the price, q˜t+1|ν,ht+1 , is defined in (18), the expectation is over the future global states,
{sτ}Tt+1, zi,τ = khτ (xi,0, ai,0, . . . , ai,τ−1) for τ > t, and ai,τ = ντ (xi,τ , hτ ) for τ ≥ t. The expression (57)
is the part of the right derivative of the expected social welfare (32) with respect to the action ai,t,
which reflects the influence of consumer i’s action at stage t on the ancillary cost H˜(A˜t, A˜t+1, st+1)
at the next stage, and on her future utility (due to the influence of the action ai,t on the future
state zi,τ , through the functions khτ (·)). In (56), g−t|ν,ht(xi,0) can be defined by replacing the right
(left) partial derivatives in (57) with left (respectively, right) partial derivatives.
Given an initial global state s0, and the initial state of consumer i, xi,0, her oblivious value,
defined in (21), is a deterministic, concave function of the vector
{νt (xi,0, ht)}ht∈H(s0) (58)
of actions that she would take at any given stage and for any given history. Since the DOE strategy
ν maximizes consumer i’s oblivious value, it is easily checked that the vector in (58) must satisfy
the conditions (56). Since this is true for any xi,0 ∈ X0, we conclude that the action vector (55)
13 We use the notations ∂+f and ∂−f to denote the right and left, respectively, derivatives of a function f .
14 If for some τ > t, khτ (·) is decreasing in ai,t, then the right partial derivative of Uτ (xi,τ , sτ , ai,τ ) with respect to
zi,τ in (57) should be replaced by its left partial derivative.
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(which is comprised by putting together the vectors in (58), for different types in the set X0)
satisfies the conditions (56). Thus, the DOE ν satisfies the sufficient condition for optimality and
the result (54) follows.
D.2. Proof of Part (b)
For a given initial global state s0, let us fix some initial distribution f
n
0 with d(f
n
0 , ηs0)≤ δ, where
δ is small. In Step 1, we compare the social welfare achieved by various strategy profiles and show
that
1
n
Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn)≤
1
n
Wn0 (s0 |ϑn,f
n
0 )≈ W˜0(s0 | ϑn,fn0 ).
Here, κn is a general history-dependent strategy profile for the n-consumer model (cf. (22)). The
symmetric strategy profile ϑn,f
n
0 = (ϑn,f
n
0 , . . . , ϑn,f
n
0 ) is one that maximizes expected social welfare
given the initial population state fn0 . In Step 1, we will argue that ϑ
n,fn0 can be identified with
a dynamic oblivious strategy. In the approximate equality we are comparing the expected (over
future global states, {st}Tt=1) social welfare under the same oblivious strategy ϑn,f
n
0 (hence the same
sequence of actions for each consumer type x ∈ X0) under two different initial population states
(initial distributions of consumer types), fn0 and ηs0 .
Since ν is a DOE, part (a) of the theorem implies that
W˜0(s0 | ϑn,fn0 )≤ W˜0(s0 | ν).
Note that as the number of consumer grows large, with high probability the initial population state
fn0 is close to its expectation, ηs0 . In Step 2, we complete the proof of part (b) by showing that
W˜0(s0 | ν)≈ 1
n
E{Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | νn)},
where the expectation is over the initial population state fn0 .
Step 1: If the initial population state is close to its expectation, the optimal social welfare in
an n-consumer model can be approximated by the social welfare achieved by a dynamic oblivious
strategy in the corresponding continuum model.
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In this step, we aim to show that in an n-consumer model, for any given initial global state s0
and any ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such that for any initial distribution fn0 with d(f
n
0 , ηs0)≤ δ,
we can find a dynamic oblivious strategy ϑn,f
n
0 that satisfies
Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn)≤ nW˜0(s0 | ϑn,f
n
0 ) + εn, (59)
for all symmetric history-dependent strategy profiles, κn = (κn, . . . , κn). Given an initial global
state s0 and an initial population state f
n
0 , we observe that the social welfare, Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | κn),
is a deterministic, concave function of the following vector of consumers’ actions under different
histories, {
κnt
(
mi,κn,ht(xi,0), ht, f
n
−i,t
)}
ht∈H(s0), xi,0∈X0, i=1,...,n
, (60)
where mi,κn,ht :X0→Yt maps consumer i’s initial state into her augmented state at the history ht,
under the strategy profile κn, and fn−i,t is the distribution of other consumers’ augmented states at
the history ht, under the strategy profile κ
n. Note that given the initial population state fn0 , the
strategy profile κn, and a history ht, the augmented state of consumer i at stage t depends only
on her initial state xi,0.
Since the social welfare Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | κn) is concave in the action vector in (60), there exists a
symmetric solution, ϑn,f
n
0 = {ϑn,fn0t }Tt=0, such that if at any history ht ∈H(s0), all consumers with
the same initial state take the same action according to
ai,t = ϑ
n,fn0
t (xi,0, ht), i= 1, . . . , n, (61)
then the expected social welfare, Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | κn), is maximized among all possible symmetric
history-dependent strategy profiles15. In (61) we have defined a dynamic oblivious strategy ϑn,f
n
0
that maximizes the expected social welfare in the n-consumer model, conditional on the initial
global state being s0, and the initial population state being f
n
0 . That is, in an n-consumer model,
for any given s0 and f
n
0 , there exists a dynamic oblivious strategy ϑ
n,fn0 such that
supκnWn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn) =Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |ϑn,f
n
0 ), (62)
15 The fact that the supremum is attained is a consequence of our continuity assumption and the fact that the various
variables of interest can be restricted to be in a compact set.
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where ϑn,f
n
0 = (ϑn,f
n
0 , . . . , ϑn,f
n
0 ) is the corresponding symmetric dynamic oblivious strategy profile.
To verify (59), it suffices to show that for any ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such that for any fn0
with d(fn0 , ηs0)≤ δ, ∣∣∣Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |ϑn,fn0 )−nW˜0(s0 | ϑn,fn0 )∣∣∣≤ εn, (63)
i.e., if all consumers use the strategy ϑn,f
n
0 , the difference between the optimal social welfare
achieved in an n-consumer model and the social welfare achieved in the corresponding continuum
model can be made arbitrarily small, if the initial population state is close enough to its expectation,
ηs0 . We next argue that the result in (63) holds for any dynamic oblivious strategy ϑ.
To prove (63), we first upper bound the difference between the supplier cost in an n-consumer
model and that in the corresponding continuum model. Since all cost functions are Lipschitz
continuous (see Eqs. (27) and (28)), for any ε > 0, there exists some δ1 > 0 such that if
∣∣∣Ant −nA˜t|ϑ,ht∣∣∣≤Xδ1Bn, t= 0, . . . , T, ∀ht ∈H(s0), (64)
then ∣∣∣Cn(Ant , st)−Cn(nA˜t|ϑ,ht , st)∣∣∣≤ nε/(3T + 3), t= 0, . . . , T, ∀ht ∈Ht(s0), (65)∣∣∣Hn0 (An0 , s0)−Hn0 (nA˜0|ϑ,h0 , s0)∣∣∣≤ nε/(3T + 3), (66)
and for t= 1, . . . , T ,
∣∣∣Hn(Ant−1,Ant , st)−Hn(nA˜t−1|ϑ,ht−1 , nA˜t|ϑ,ht , st)∣∣∣≤ nε/(3T + 3), ∀ht ∈Ht(s0), (67)
where Ht(s0) is the set of all histories of length t+ 1 commencing at state s0. Given an initial
population state fn0 , if all consumers use the strategy ϑ, the aggregate demand under a history ht
is
Ant = n
∑
x∈X0
fn0 (x)ϑt(x,ht).
From (16) we observe that if d(fn0 , ηs0)≤ δ1, the condition in (64) holds, and then Eqs. (65)-(67)
are verified.
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We now show that if the initial population state is close to its expectation, the total utility
obtained by all consumers is close to its counterpart in the corresponding continuum model. Given
an initial population state fn0 , we write the total utility obtained by all consumers under a history
ht as
n∑
i=1
Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t) = n
∑
x∈X0
fn0 (x)Ut (lϑ,ht(x), ϑt(x,ht), st) .
On the other hand, the utility achieved in the corresponding continuum model is given by
U˜t|ϑ,ht
∆
=
∑
x∈X0
ηs0(x)Ut (lϑ,ht(x), ϑt(x,ht), st) .
We have that if d(fn0 , ηs0)≤ ε/(3XQ(T + 1)), then∣∣∣∑n
i=1
Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t)−nU˜t|ϑ,ht
∣∣∣≤ nε/(3T + 3), t= 0, . . . , T, ∀ht ∈Ht(s0), ∀n∈N+, (68)
Let δ= min{δ1, ε/(3XQ(T + 1))}. If d(fn0 , ηs0)≤ δ, from (65)-(68) we have∣∣∣W˜t(ht | ϑ)−W nt (fnt , ht |ϑn)∣∣∣≤ nε/(T + 1), t= 0, . . . , T, ∀ht ∈Ht(s0).
Eq. (63) follows from the definition of expected social welfare in an n-consumer model (31), and
in a continuum model (32). The desired result in (59) follows.
Step 2: Asymptotic social optimality of a DOE.
In this step, we complete the proof of part (b) of the theorem, using the fact that as the number of
consumers grows large, with high probability the initial population state is close to its expectation.
Note that the action space is [0,B], so that |At| ≤ nB. Using Assumption 3, Cn(·)/n is therefore
bounded. A similar argument holds for Hn0 (·)/n and Hn(·)/n. Furthermore, the total utility per
consumer is also bounded. Thus, there exists some constant D that upper bounds |Wn0 /n|. We
define Fns0(δ) as the set of initial population states such that d(f
n
0 , ηs0) ≤ δ. By the law of large
numbers, for any pair of positive real numbers, ε and δ, we can find an integer N such that
∑
fn0 /∈Fns0 (δ)
P
(
F ns0 = f
n
0
)
· sup
κn
|Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn)| ≤DP(d(fn0 , ηs0)> δ)≤ εn, ∀n≥N. (69)
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For any ε > 0, let δ be the positive real number defined in (59), and let N be the positive integer
given in (69); for any n≥N and any symmetric history-dependent strategy profile κn, we have
E{Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn)}
≤
∑
fn0 ∈Fns0 (δ)
P
(
F ns0 = f
n
0
) ·Wn0 (fn0 , s0 |κn) + εn
≤
∑
fn0 ∈Fns0 (δ)
P
(
F ns0 = f
n
0
) ·(nW˜0(s0 | ϑn,fn0 ) + εn)+ εn
≤
∑
fn0 ∈Fns0 (δ)
P
(
F ns0 = f
n
0
) ·(nW˜0(s0 | ν) + εn)+ εn
≤
∑
fn0 ∈Fns0 (δ)
P
(
F ns0 = f
n
0
) · (Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | νn) + 2εn) + εn
≤E{Wn0 (fn0 , s0 | νn)}+ 4εn,
where the first inequality follows from (69), the second inequality is due to (59), the third inequality
follows from the optimality property of the DOE ν (part (a) of the theorem), the fourth inequality
follows similar to (63) (the proof of Eq. (63) remains valid for any dynamic oblivious strategy),
and the last inequality follows from (69).
E. Numerical Results
In this section we give a numerical example to compare the proposed pricing mechanism with
marginal cost pricing. The comparison is carried out in terms of DOEs and the resulting social
welfare under the corresponding continuum model. Towards this purpose, we first define the DOE
for a continuum model under the marginal cost pricing mechanism, in Section E.1. In Section
E.2, we consider a two-stage dynamic model in which the consumers’ marginal utility and demand
increase at the second stage. We calculate the equilibria resulting from the two pricing mechanisms,
and compare the potential of the two pricing mechanisms to improve social welfare and reduce
peak load.
E.1. Equilibrium under Marginal Cost Pricing
In an n-consumer model, at stage t≥ 1, the supplier’s marginal cost is
(Cn)′(Ant , st) +
∂Hn(Ant−1,A
n
t , st)
∂Ant
= pnt +w
n
t , t= 1, . . . , T. (70)
At stage 0, the supplier’s marginal cost is
(Cn)′(An0 , s0) + (H
n
0 )
′(An0 , s0) = p
n
0 +w
n
0 . (71)
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Under marginal cost pricing, each consumer’s stage payoff is
pi(yi,t, st, ai,t, f
n
−i,t, u
n
−i,t) =U(xi,t, st, ai,t)− (pnt +wnt ) · ai,t, (72)
where the stage marginal cost, pnt +w
n
t , is given in (70) and (71), and yi,t = (xi,t, ai,t−1).
For marginal cost pricing, we now define the nonatomic equilibrium concept in the corresponding
continuum model. Suppose that all consumers other than i use a dynamic oblivious strategy ν.
Consumer i’s oblivious stage value under marginal cost pricing is given by
pii,t(yi,t, st, ft|ν,ht , ai,t | ν) =Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t)− (p˜t|ν,ht + w˜t|ν,ht) · ai,t, (73)
where p˜t|ν,ht and w˜t|ν,ht are defined in (17) and (18). Replacing the oblivious stage value function
in (19) with that given in (73), we can define an equilibrium concept for the marginal cost pricing
mechanism in a similar way as for the DOE in Section 4.
E.2. Numerical Example
In current wholesale electricity markets, we observe that the highest daily wholesale price usually
occurs when the system load increases quickly (cf. Fig. 1 in Section 1). Inspired by the above
observation, we construct a two-stage dynamic model, in which the aggregate demand increases
quickly at the second stage, to compare the performance of the proposed mechanism with marginal
cost pricing. For simplicity, we assume that there is a continuum of identical consumers indexed by
i∈ [0,1]. Each consumer would like to consume 1+x and 1.2−x at the two stages, where x∈ [0,E].
Here, E ∈ [0,0.1] (a given constant) is the amount of electricity demand that can be shifted from
the second stage to the first stage. The value of E will be called demand substitutability16.
Formally, consumer i’s state at each stage denotes the maximum amount of electricity she could
use at the stage17. For a given consumer i, we have xi,0 = 1 + E, and her state at stage 1 is
determined as follows:
16 There are two types of elasticity of consumers’ demand: (i) consumers may curtail their demand at a high price,
and (ii) they may shift their demand to a less expensive time. The first type of demand response is a price elasticity,
and the second type is an elasticity of substitution across time. The first type of elasticity is incorporated in our
model through the utility functions, and the second type of elasticity is incorporated through E.
17 Since all consumers are of the same type, the consumer state space in this example is a subset of [0,∞).
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1. if ai,0 ≤ 1, the maximum amount of electricity she could use at stage 1 is 1.2−E +E, i.e.,
xi,1 = 1.2;
2. if 1 < ai,0 ≤ xi,0, the maximum amount of electricity she could use at stage 1 is xi,1 =1.2−
E+ (xi,0− ai,0) = 2.2− ai,0;
3. if xi,0 <ai,0, the maximum amount of electricity she could use at stage 1 is xi,1 =1.2−E.
To summarize, we have
xi,1 = 1.2−E+ max{0, xi,0−max{ai,0,1}}.
For each stage t, the utility functions are given by
Ut(xi,t, st, ai,t) =
{
dtai,t, if 0≤ ai,t ≤ xi,t,
dtxi,t, if ai,t >xi,t,
where the slopes are d0 = 10 and d1 = 12. Here, we assumed that the consumers place a larger
value on electricity during peak hours, and that shifting peak load to off-peak hours hurts con-
sumer utility. For example, rescheduling kitchen and laundry activities may cause inconvenience
for residential consumers; similarly, industrial consumers may face higher labor cost premiums for
off-peak production.
The primary cost function (cf. Section 2) is C˜(A,s) =A2, for any s. We assume that the capacity
available at each stage is proportional to the system load, i.e.,
Gt = btAt, t= 0,1,
and that the ancillary cost depends only on the difference between the capacity available at two
consecutive stages. At the second stage (peak hour), we assume that the system operator maintains
a reserve margin of 10%, i.e., b1 = 1.1. We will consider two different system operator policies: (i)
the system operator does not forecast the load jump at the second stage, and uses a conservative
policy under which b0 = 1.12, and (ii) the system operator predicts the load jump at the second
stage, and ramps up the system capacity in advance, by letting b0 = 1.2.
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For simplicity, we use a quadratic function to approximate the ancillary cost associated with
load fluctuations:
H˜0(A0, s0) = 10(max{b0A0− 1.12,0})2, H˜(A0,A1, s1) = 20(max{b1A1− b0A0,0})2,
where 1.12 represents the capacity available at the stage before the initial stage18. We assumed a
higher coefficient, 20, for the ancillary cost at the second stage, due to the increase of the system
load.
For different levels of demand substitutability E, and two different system operator policies (b0
equal to 1.12 or b0 = 1.2), we compare the social welfare (in Section E.2.1) and the peak load (in
Section E.2.2) resulting from the equilibria of the two pricing mechanisms.
E.2.1. Social welfare gain. For various levels of demand substitutability (E ∈ [0,0.1]), and
the two different system operator policies, we calculate the equilibria resulting from the two pricing
mechanisms. Fig. 3 compares the social welfare achieved by the proposed mechanism and the
marginal cost pricing mechanism. We observe from Fig. 3 the following.
1. System operator’s policy: When the consumers have a low level of demand substitutability,
the policy with b0 = 1.2 achieves a much higher social welfare than the conservative policy (b0 =
1.12), under both the proposed and the marginal cost pricing mechanisms. (This is to be expected,
because when b0 = 1.12, and with the demand at stage 1 more or less fixed, the difference b1A1−b0A0
is necessarily large.) For consumers with a high level of demand substitutability, the policy with
b0 = 1.2 achieves a slightly smaller social welfare than the conservative policy (b0 = 1.12), because
the policy with b0 = 1.2 results in a lower price at the second stage than the conservative one, and
therefore does not provide enough encouragement to the consumers to shift their peak load (cf.
the discussion in Section E.2.2).
2. Social welfare gain at a low level of demand substitutability: At a low level of
demand substitutability, e.g., when E ≤ 0.02, and under the system operator’s conservative policy
18 Suppose that the load at stage “−1” is 1, and that the capacity available at stage −1 is 1.12, under an average
reserve margin of 12%.
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Figure 3 The social welfare achieved by the proposed pricing mechanism, the marginal cost pricing mechanism
and the flat rate pricing mechanism, as a function of the demand substitutability, E.
(b0 = 1.12), we observe that the proposed pricing mechanism achieves significantly more social
welfare gain (the social welfare achieved by flat rate pricing19 is used a reference) than marginal
cost pricing; if the system operator ramps up the capacity in advance (b0 = 1.2), both pricing
mechanisms achieve approximately the same social welfare as flat rate pricing.
3. Social welfare gain at a high level of demand substitutability: If the consumers have
a high demand substitutability, e.g., when E ≥ 0.08, the proposed pricing mechanism achieves
approximately 5% more social welfare gain than marginal cost pricing under the system operator’s
conservative policy (b0 = 1.12); if the system operator ramps up the capacity in advance (b0 =
1.2), the proposed pricing mechanism achieves approximately 50% more social welfare gain than
marginal cost pricing.
Let us now derive some insights by considering the special case of zero demand substitutability
(E = 0) and b0 = 1.12. The one-stage aggregate demand and the social welfare resulting from the
19 Under flat rate pricing, consumers pay a fixed (time-invariant) retail price for the electricity they consume. Since
the average retail price is less than the consumers’ marginal utility (see Tables 2 and 4), the payoff-maximizing
consumer demand at the two stages is 1 and 1.2, respectively. Since all consumers are identical, the aggregate demand
at the two stages is 1 and 1.2.
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Table 1 Demand and social welfare (per consumer) at E = 0 and b0 = 1.12
a0 a1 Social welfare
Flat rate 1 1.2 21.16
Marginal cost 1 1.2 21.16
Proposed 1.0901 1.2 21.4735
Table 2 Price fluctuation at E = 0 and b0 = 1.12. The price pt +wt equals the marginal cost at stage t.
p0 +w0 p1 +w1 q1 Average (retail) price
Flat rate 2 11.2 - 7.0182
Marginal cost 2 11.2 - 7.0182
Proposed 4.4401 6.7609 -4.4401 5.6562
three pricing mechanisms are given in Table 1. The prices faced by consumers are given in Table
2, where the average retail price is the ratio of the total money a consumer pays at an equilibrium
to her total demand during the two stages.20 Note that under the proposed pricing mechanism, a
consumer pays
(p0 +w0 + q1)ai,0 + (p1 +w1)ai,1,
while she would pay (p0 +w0)ai,0 + (p1 +w1)ai,1 under marginal cost pricing. In general, the price
q1 will be negative and will be even smaller if we were to increase the aggregate demand at the
second stage. That is, a higher peak load results in a lower price at the first stage, which encourages
consumers to increase their demand at the off-peak hour, even if they do not derive any additional
utility from such an increase. In fact, from Table 2 we observe that at the DOE, the proposed pricing
mechanism offers each consumer a zero total price on a0. This may appear illogical at first sight.
The reason is that due to the conservative reserve policy, with b0 = 1.12, a demand of a0 = 1 results
in a large increase from b0a0 to b1a1 and hence a large ancillary cost. The increase of the demand
a0 beyond 1 does not provide any utility to the consumer, but reduces the ancillary cost. Thus,
the counterintuitive choice of a0 = 1.0901 serves to mitigate a conservative and somewhat deficient
reserve policy. This suggests that further research is needed that will include an intertemporal
optimization of the reserve policy as well.
20 Note that only consumers under flat rate pricing pay this price. We list the average prices for the two real-time
pricing mechanisms to compare the consumers’ expense under different pricing mechanisms.
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Table 3 Demand and social welfare (per consumer) at E = 0.08 and b0 = 1.2
a0 a1 Social welfare
Flat rate 1 1.2 21.608
Marginal cost 1.0131 1.1869 21.6857
Proposed 1.0308 1.1692 21.7237
Table 4 Price fluctuation at E = 0.08 and b0 = 1.2. The price pt +wt equals the marginal cost at stage t.
p0 +w0 p1 +w1 q1 Average (retail) price
Flat rate 3.92 7.68 - 5.971
Marginal cost 4.324 6.324 - 5.403
Proposed 4.868 4.505 -2.363 3.568
For the case where the system operator ramps up the capacity in advance (b0 = 1.2), and con-
sumers have a high level of demand substitutability (E = 0.08), the one-stage aggregate demand
and the social welfare resulting from the three pricing mechanisms are given in Table 3. The prices
faced by consumers are given in Table 4. From Table 3 we observe that under the proposed pric-
ing mechanism, consumers would like to shift 0.031 peak load to off-peak hours, while under the
marginal cost pricing mechanism, consumers are willing to shift less than 0.014 peak load to off-
peak hours. Compared to marginal cost pricing, the more flattened load curve resulting from the
proposed pricing mechanism leads to 50% more social welfare gain.
For a given load curve, the proposed pricing mechanism results in a larger price difference between
stage 1 and stage 0 than marginal cost pricing, because of the negative price q1. The negative price
q1 creates an additional incentive for consumers to shift their load from stage 1 to stage 0. In this
way, the proposed pricing mechanism results in a more flattened load curve and a higher social
welfare than marginal cost pricing (cf. Table 3).
E.2.2. Peak load reduction. Under flat rate pricing, the peak load (the aggregate demand
at the second stage) is 1.2, because consumers do not have an incentive to shift their load to off-peak
hours. Given a pricing mechanism and a system operator’s policy (b0), consumers are willing to
substitute across time only up to a certain level. Even with a high level of demand substitutability,
consumers prefer not to shift much of their peak load, to avoid the utility loss caused by peak load
shifting. For example, with b0 = 1.2 and E = 0.08, consumers under marginal cost pricing choose
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Figure 4 Comparison of the percentage of peak load reduction (the peak load under flat rate pricing, 1.2, is used
a reference) resulting from the proposed pricing mechanism and the marginal cost pricing mechanism,
as a function b0.
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Figure 5 Real-time prices and actual system loads on August 01, 2011, ISO New England Inc. Blue bars represent
the real-time system loads and the dots connected by a black line represent the hourly prices.
to shift at most 0.013 peak load (cf. Table 3). In Fig. 4, for different values of b0, we compare the
maximum amount of peak load consumers choose to shift under the proposed pricing mechanism
and the marginal cost pricing mechanism.
We observe from Fig. 4 that the amount of peak load consumers will shift decreases with b0.
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This is because a larger reserve at the first stage lowers the price at the second stage, which in
turn discourages consumers from shifting their peak load. The proposed pricing mechanism results
in a peak load which is approximately 1.5 percent lower than that resulting from marginal cost
pricing, regardless of the value of b0. If the system operator ramps up the system capacity in
advance (b0 = 1.2), marginal cost pricing reduces the system peak load resulting from flat rate
pricing by approximately one percent. Compared to marginal cost pricing, the negative price q1 in
the proposed mechanism encourages consumers to make a larger shift of their peak load (cf. the
discussion at the end of Section E.2.1).
Fig. 5 plots the real-time system loads and prices on August 1, 2011, a typical hot summer day
in New England21. If consumers are able to shift some of their load to the morning (possibly at
the expense of losing some utility), the proposed pricing mechanism encourages consumers to shift
more of their peak load than marginal cost pricing. Since the highest peak load determines the
generation capacity necessary for system reliability, the proposed pricing mechanism has a greater
potential to reduce the long-term capacity investment.
21 www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/new-england/2011/08-2011-elec-isone-dly.pdf
